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1. Policy Instruments
MONETARY POLICY
Monetary policy is conducted primarily by the Bank of Japan in Coop-
eration with, or subject to the approval of, the Ministry of Finance.
Commercial banking institutions in Japan are of various types; some
private, others established and run by the government; some of a gen-
eral nature, others fulfilling specialized functions. The most important
category of banks is that known as "All Banks," consisting of "City
Banks," "Trust Banks" and "Long-Term Credit Banks"; in terms of
the amount of loans or the size of. deposits, these constitute over 80
per cent of the commercial banking system. Other categories of bank-
type financial institutions are usually restricted in nature to rather
narrow purposes. They include such institutions as agricultural or in-
dustrial cooperatives, credit associations, or investment corporations.
Monetary policy is concerned, by and large, although not exclusively,
with the category of "All Banks"—where, in turn, it affects primarily
the large (and heavily concentrated) "City Banks." The following are
the actual or potential instruments at the disposal of the Bank of Japan.
The Discount Rate. This is the major instrument used in the conduct
of monetary policy in Japan. The rate, or rates, apply to bills dis-
counted at the Bank of Japan and to advances against collateral from
the Bank to commercial banks (there are usually no overdrafts on the
Bank). These loans and discounts have been very important in Japan
not only as a means of bridging temporary gaps in banks' reserves, as
is customary elsewhere, but also as a major long-term (in effect)
source of liquidity for the banking system. Since, as will be mentioned
later, the government's budget has been approximately balanced for
reasonably long periods of time and open-market operations are ofJAPAN 157
minor importance, borrowing from the central bank is the only major
source of additional banking liquidity beside the accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves.
During most of the period under survey, the Bank of Japan applied
a syste.m of multiple discount rates. This was known as the "higher-
interest-rate system." Each bank was allocated a quota of loans from
the Bank of Japan, for which a low "basic" discount rate was in force.
Above this quota a higher rate—the "first penalty rate"—came into
effect. Sometimes a second margin of Bank of Japan lending was estab-
lished, beyond which a still higher rate—the "second penalty rate"—
was applied. Until August 1955, the basic discount rate was of prac-
tically no significance for monetary policy: loans to all the banks con-
siderably exceeded their rationed quotas so that the first penalty rates,
and very often the second, were the relevant rates for decisions at the
margin. In August 1955, the basic rate was increased considerably and
quotas were changed. From that date on, the basic rate became indeed
the usually meaningful figure. Higher penalty rates were still applied
even at later dates, but sparingly and in exceptional cases. In 1962,
the system of "higher interest rates" was abolished altogether.
In addition to influencing the amount of banks' borrowing through
changes in the discount rate, the Bank of Japan sometimes determines
actual ceilings of the amounts lent to each individual bank. This is
done in connection with rationing the credit granted by commercial
banks to their customers, a practice which will be mentioned shortly.
Reserve Requirements. The minimum-reserve requirement instru-
ment has been used only for the last few years and is still of minor
significance. Traditionally, commercial banks in Japan have held prac-
tically no reserves beyond the cash used in day-to-day operations and
small deposits at the Bank of Japan required for interbank clearing.
In 1957, a law was passed which enabled the Bank of Japan to re-
quire the banks to hold reserves, in the form of deposits at the Bank
of Japan, at a ratio not e.xceeding 10 per cent of the banks' deposits.
In fact, reserve requirements were laid down for the first time in
September 1959; the reserve ratios varied then according to the type
of bank and the type of deposit, but they were all very low—around
1per cent of bank deposits. Minimum-reserve ratios were raised
slightly in October 1961 and again in December 1963; on the latter
date, they reached .5 per cent of time deposits and 3 per cent of sight
deposits. Apparently, these increases, besides being slight, were not
considered as monetary measures intended to affect current monetary158DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
developments. As a rule, reserve requirements have thus not played
any signfficant role; although toward the end of 1965, a reduction of
legal reserve ratios (to virtually zero) was undertaken apparently as a
means of encouraging monetary expansion.
Open-Market 'Operations. The instrument of open-market opera-
tions, as this term is normally understood, was not employed in Japan
until recent years. This has been attributed to a number of factors,
chief of which were the lack of a substantial organized capital market
and a low pegging of rates on government securities. Occasionally, the
Bank of Japan conducted a transaction in securities with a commercial
bank, but this was usually a bilateral, ad hoc transaction—with a spe-
cffic bank, in a specific security, and for a specified period. It was usu-
ally motivated by the desire to bail the bank concerned out of a par-
ticular difficulty or, conversely, to provide it with an outlet for a
particularly large accumulation of reserves. It was not used as an
instrument of over-all monetary policy.
Toward the end of the period (since 1963), open-market opera-
tions became more significant in size and probably a more integral
part of over-all monetary policy; they are still, however, conducted in
a bilateral manner rather than strictly in the open market.
Direct Credit Control. The Bank of Japan has maintained, with
varying degrees of severity, a direct control on the amount of credit
granted by each individual bank. In general, this has been an im-
portant instrument—in fact, the only significant tool of monetary
policy aside from discount rate manipulations. 'Naturally, the use of
this control is limited to periods when the banks wish to expand their
loans more than the Bank of Japan is willing to allow: it cannot be
used to encourage an expansion of credit. By and large, therefore, this
instrument was relevant primarily when the monetary authorities were
trying to limit, rather than encourage, the expansion of credit.
The control system was adopted in its present form in 1954. It oper-
ates not on a formal, legal basis but through "moral suasion" by the
Bank of Japan and is known as the "discount-window operation," or
"official gUidance." Despite its informal character, it is extensive and
rather detailed, particularly with regard to the few large "City Banks,"
and the "Long-Term Credit Banks." The Bank of Japan, in consul-
tation with the banks, determines—at least at certain periods—the
amount of credits that each can extend to the public in a month's time;
it sometimes follows the actual development of the banks' accounts onJAPAN 159
a day-by-day basis. The Bank of Japan imposes its views both by
moral suasion and by pressure and sanctions, either threatened or actu-
ally practiced. Sanctions include primarily a restriction of the amount
of Bank of Japan lending to the "delinquent" bank; or, insofar as the
banking system as a whole is concerned, a threat that discount rates
will be further increased if the "voluntary" control proves to be in-
effective.
FISCAL POLICY
The central government's budget consists of various accounts. The
most important among these is the general account, which encompasses
most of the normal government activities, both of a current and a
capital nature. In addition, there are about forty "special accounts."
These have widely different functions, sources of income, and types of
expenditure. Some of them channel savings accumulated by govern-
mental savings institutions or by the social security system into capital
expenditures. A major "special account," from the standpoint of size,
is the foodstuffs control program, which is essentially a form of sub-
sidization of mass-consumed (and mass-produced) foodstuffs, pri-
marily rice. Another major "special account" is the foreign excli'ange
account. Strictly speaking, this is not a legitimate part of the govern-
ment's budget but a reflection of the movement of foreign exchange
in the country's foreign transactions. In Japan, as frequently happens
in other countries with foreign exchange control, these transactions are
handled formally through the Treasury.
In principle, the government adheres to a balanced-budget policy,
and has indeed maintained a roughly balanced budget over the period
as 'a whole. As a rule, the general account provides a surplus, which
is transferred to some of the special accounts, thus maintaining an
over-all balance. Over short periods, however—sometimes of a few
years—deficits or surpluses do show up.
The budgetary procedure in Japan apparently does not allow a large
measure of administrative flexibility. Supervision of the budgetary per-
formance by the parliament (the Diet) is tight; rules are determined
in advance for the annual budget without leaving much leeway in ac-
tual execution.
The government does not, as a rule, borrow much from the public
(including the commercial banks). As mentioned earlier, interest ratesi6oDEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
on government bonds are pegged at a low level, considerably below
comparable rates in the market. Likewise, the government does not
normally deal in short-term borrowing from (or lending to) foreign
countries. Budgetary cash surpluses and deficits are expressed, thus,
mainly in changes in the government's indebtedness to the Bank of
Japan.' The Bank is not restricted, by law in its extension of credit to
the government. It is, moreover, obligated to underwrite the govern-
ment's short-term securities. The government itself, on the other hand,
is legally denied the right to borrow at long term from the Bank of
Japan or to sell long-term securities to it. In effect,. the Bank of Japan's
obligation to "underwrite" government securities implies that it has
actually to buy these securities, since the public would not buy them
under the conditions of their issuance; some securities are resold, how-
ever, to governmental agencies. In the earlier years of the period, a
sizable portion of the government's indebtedness to the Bank of Japan
took the form of loans. These later declined, and from about 1954 to
1961 loans to the government were nil or negligible in comparison
with the amount of government bonds at the Bank. Since 1962, how-
ever, loans—this time in the form of debentures rather than advances—
again became prominent.
2.. Statistical Analysis
Data on changes in policy and target variables are presented in dia-
grammatic form in Chart 8-1. It appears that the series (not shown in
the chart) of balance-of-payments surpluses and deficits since 1958
gives almost the same impression, so far as turning points in directions
of movements are concerned, as the series of gold and foreign exchange
reserves. It was therefore decided to take the latter—with minor modi-
fications suggested by the former—as the indicator of imbalances of
payments. An upward movement of this magnitude is considered an
upward imbalance (that is; a balance-of-payments surplus), and a
1Theword "cash" should be emphasized. "Accrued" obligations of the public
to the government, or vice versa, are certainly widespread. It may also be men-
tioned that from time to time the government becomes indebted to commercial
banks due to the latter's assumption of deferred government payments. For
instance, food sudsidies may first be paid out by commercial banks, which are
later reimbursed by the government.JAPAN 161
CHART 8-1















NoTE:Diagonal-line areas represent period of downward imbalances; gray areas repre-
sent stability; white areas represent upward imbalances.
downward movement is considered a downward imbalance. The sub-
periods are presented in the first column of Table 8-1.
Looking, first, at the discount rate (column 2 of Table 8-1), it is
immediately apparent that this variable moved consistently—indeed





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a downward imbalance of payments took place, and lowered in opposite
instances.2 The evidence thus suggests the tentative conclusion that
discount-rate policy was used by the Bank of Japan as an instrument
of balance-of-payments adjustment.
Next, in column 3 of Table 8-1, Bank of Japan lending to commer-
cial banks is examined. Here a consistent pattern again appears, but
in the opposite direction. These loans move regularly upward at times
of a downward imbalance, and vice versa; these are, of course, move-
ments which could augment imbalances rather than correct them. In
the few exceptions to this pattern, the variable in question merely did
not move, instead of moving in a disadjusting dire'ction; only in one
instance, the upward imbalance of 1950, did the variable actually move
in a way consistent with balance-of-payments adjustment.
The fact that commercial bank borrowing from the central bank
increased, as a rule, when the discount rate was raised, and diminished
when the rate was lowered, may seem somewhat surprising. This rela-
tionship may be explained, however, in the light of concurrent changes
in other variables. I will come back to this relationship after examining
the other related variables.
The other component of the Bank of Japan's domestic claims is its
net claims on the government. Unfortunately, the amount of such
claims as they appear in the data is misleading, because the size of
these claims is heavily affected, in a biased way, by foreign exchange
movements. A decline in foreign exchange reserves, for instance, would
usually, but not necessarily always, mean a (net) sale of foreign ex-
change (not drawn, most often, from the Bank) by the government's
foreign exchange fund to the public. This, in turn, would increase the
government's deposits at the Bank, or be used to redeem government
debt to the Bank, thus reducing the government's net indebtedness to
the Bank. An impression of a movement in an adjusting direction may
thereby be created. But, in fact, the adjusting impact is that of the
movement of foreign exchange itself, and recording its reflection in the
government's accounts at the Bank would amount to double counting.8
2Itshould be recalled that data on discount rate variations are relevant, so
far as the "basic" rate is concerned, only from August 1955 onward. Partial
information on the manipulation of the "penalty rates" indicates, however, that
discount rate variations were employed in an adjusting direction also during the
downward imbalance of the first half of 1954 and of the following upward im-
balance of mid-1954 to the end of 1955.
3Frompublished sources, there does not seem to be a reliable way of sepa-
rating the effect of the government's foreign exchange transactions from its other
transactions.164DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
In an indirect way, however, some conception of this variable can
be gained by looking at the movements of the budgetary balance. As
will be be recalled, the government conducts its financial transactions
(other than those in foreign exchange) primarily with the Bank of
Japan rather than with the public or with commercial banks. Move-
ments of the variable under consideration are, thus, primarily the
mirror reflection of the government's cash balance. It will be observed
later that this balance does not show a consistent reaction to imbalances
of payments throughout the period, and during the 1950's it may be
regarded as having been changed most often in a disadjusting direction.
Due to the deficiency of the data on the Bank's net claims on the
government, for the purpose at hand, the recorded magnitude of total
domestic assets of the Bank may also be biased. However, it is not
difficult to guess what an unbiased record would have shown. The
budgetary balance, as has just been mentioned, usually did not tend
to move in a way which would offset the movements of the Bank's
claims on commercial banks: on the contrary, the two moved most often
together in a disadjusting direction. It may therefore be quite safely
assumed that had bias-free data on the Bank's total domestic claims
existed, they would have shown consistent movements in a disadjusting
direction. Moreover, even without the necessary correction (that is,
including movements biased in an adjusting direction), the data give
the same indication. This is shown in column 4 of Table 8-1, in which
the frequency of movements in a disadjusting direction appears to be
only slightly less than in column 3.
Loans of commercial banks to the public are represented in column
5ofTable 8-1. They increased continuously at a rather fast pace
throughout the period under review, and the rate of increase appears
to be rather stable over the subperiods of imbalances of payments. The
rate does 'not seem to vary much among these periods; in the few
instances where it does, the variations show no consistent tendency
either in the adjusting direction or in its opposite.
Money supply, on the other hand, which may be observed in column
6, does seem to react to imbalances of payments in an. adjusting direc-
tion at least from the beginning of 1954. From that period on, the rate
of increase in money supply most of the time was less during periods
of downward imbalances of payments, and greater during periods of
upward imbalances.
Turning to the fiscal variables, it appears much more difficult to dis-
tinguish any consistent reaction to imbalances of payments. Both gov-JAPAN 165
TABLE 8-2
JAPAN: REFERENCE DATES OF CYCLES
OF EXTERNAL RESERVES
Cycle Trough Peak Trough
1951—54 n1951 In1952 U1954
1954—57 ii1954 iv1956 m1957
1957—61 in1957 II1961 iv1961
1961—64 iv1961 iv1963 in1964
ernment revenues and expenditures show a clear long-term expansion-
ary trend, as should be expected. However, the rate of increase, al-
though not quite stable, does not seem to be associated with balance-
of-payments fluctuations.4 The budgetary cash balance, or the govern-
ment's excess demand, is represented in column 7 of Table It
appears that, for the period as a whole, no clear-cut pattern may be
distinguished. However, during the 1950's, movements of the balance
in a disadjusting direction do seem to dominate.
Let us now turn from the examination of subperiods of imbalances
to the application of reference cycle analysis. External reserves indeed
manifest, as may be observed from Chart 8-1, rather clear cyclical
movements. The reference dates will be determined by the turning
points of these cycles, which will be defined from trough to trough. An
expansionary phase (from trough to peak) will thus be the phase of
the cycle in which external reserves rise;, and the contractionary phase,
its opposite. The reference dates are shown in Table 8-2.
The positions of the policy variables during the reference-cycle
stages are presented in Chart 8-2. In Part A, it may be seen that the
discount rate moves almost invariably in a consistent pattern—it falls
when external reserves rise (that is, along the stages from trough to
peak), and rises when reserves fall. Bank of Japan claims on the public
4Tosave space, these variables are not shown in Table 8-1 and in Chart 8-1.
Revenues and expenditures, and thus the budgetary balance, are compiled
net of the foreign exchange account of the budget. The latter, as has been pointed
out earlier, does not form a part of the government's excess demand; its inclusion
would not only have distorted the budgetary accounts for the purpose at hand but
also clearly introduced a bias in favor of movements in an adjusting direction.
From 1958 on, the budget is presented in this way in the source (International
Financial Statistics). For earlier years, the exclusion of revenues and expendi-
tures in the foreign exchange account was done by us.i66DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
CHART 8-2
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(i.e., on commercial banks), represented in Part B, also follow a gen-
erally consistent pattern—falling during the expansionary phase of the
cycle, and rising during the contraction. Total domestic assets of the
Bank of Japan, shown in Part C, reveal a weaker pattern: 6 during the
6 But, here, the distorting effect of the inclusion of foreign exchange trans-
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expansionary phase, their level appears, as a rule, to be either falling
or rising less fast than during the contractionary phase.
Commercial bank lending to the public, shown in Part D, shows a
probably slight dependence on the stage of the foreign-exchange re-
serves cycle. Only during the cycle of ii 1954—n 1957 does this mani-
fest itself as clear-cut cyclical behavior—namely, an increase in the
rate of expansion of credit when reserves rise, and a reduction of this
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also during the cycle of iv 1961—iu 1964. It is thus apparent that this
variable did occasionally respond in an adjusting direction, but that
such response was far from being a general rule.
The rate of increase of money supply, drawn in Part B, appears as
a rule to be higher during the expansionary phase than during the sub-
sequent contraction. This observation conforms, of course, to the tenta-
tive conclusion reached earlier. However, the pattern of behavior of this
variable throughout each of these two phases is rather weak. Only
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of a gradual rise during the expansion, and a gradual decline during
the contraction. In the 1954—57 cycle this patternis approached,
though not perfectly matched, while in the other two cycles no such
patterns can be found at all.
The positions of the budgetary balance, presented in Part F, do not
reveal any consistent pattern. No regular contrast appears, either with
regard to the sign of the balance (surplus or deficit) or its form of
movement between stages of rising and falling foreign-exchange re-
serves. This evidence tends to indicate that budgetary policy was not
directed, as a rule, toward adjusting balance-of-payments disturbances.
Before trying to interpret these findings, we must ask whether the
policy measures which were identified by this analysis as being taken
to adjust balance-of-payments disturbances may not in fact be related
to other economic targets, movements of which happened to be asso-
ciated in a consistent manner with balance-of-payments disturbances.
We turn now to the examination of this possibility.
As will be recalled, alternative competing targets are represented in
the study by three variables: the rate of unemployment, the rate (and
direction) of price changes, and the rate (and direction) of changes in
industrial production. The unemployment rate, at least as it appears
in available data, has been very low throughout the period under con-
sideration. It is therefore assumed here, without further confirmation,
that these changes could not, as a rule, have explained the policy mea-
sures taken. Even if this assumption is not fully warranted, it should
be realized that the more significant changes in unemployment, at least,
would not disappear from the analysis altogether, since these changes
must be reflected in the rate of change of industrial production.
Two variables, standing for two targets, are left. One is the rate of
change of the price level; the other, the rate of change in industrial
production. Since the index of wholesale prices and the cost of living
index (in Tokyo) give substantially the same indications of price move-
ments, the latter index alone will be used to represent this variable.
The target of maintaining a stable price level will be considered violated
here not when prices move, since prices moved upward almost continu-
ously, but when their movement deviates from the price level's short-
term trend (which is measured, in turn, by a three-year moving average).
The question posed is, thus, whether the manipulations of the dis-
count rate and the budgetary balance could not be explained by either
the wish to maintain a stable (movement of) price level or the wish to
achieve a high rate of expansion of industrial production, rather than170DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
by the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment. Again, more
than one method will be used to test this hypothesis.
Take first the discount rate. In Table 8-3, each change in this vari-
able is shown for the period from 1957 onward (the change in early
1957 being the first since August 1955 when the "basic" discount
rate became meaningful). The position of each of the three alternative
target variables—external reserves, the price level, and industrial pro-
duction—is examined in each quarter in which the discount rate moved.
TABLE 8-3
JAPAN: CHANGES IN THE DISCOUNT RATE AND













I 1957 +fall * stable + high
II 1957 + fall + rises + high
IV 1959 — rise + rises ± high
III 1961 + fall + rises + high
I 1964 + fall — falls + high
Lowered:
ii 1958 + rise — rises + low
III 1958 + rise + falls * average
I 1959 + rise + falls — high
III 1960 + rise — rises * average
I 1961 + rise — rises — high
iv 1962 + rise * stable + low
I 1963 + rise — rises * average
Ix 1963 + rise — rises — high
ii1965 + rise — rises + low
'I 1965 — fall — rises + low
+ indicates that the change in the target variable would justify the direction of
change in the discount rate.
—indicatesthat the change in the target variable would justify the opposite
direction.
* indicates that the change in the target variable would call for no change in
the discount rate.JAPAN 171
It appears immediately that the movements of the discount rate are
consistent with the assumption that this instrument was used for bal-
ance-of-payments adjustment—not a surprising finding, of course, at
this stage of the analysis, since a similar finding was the starting point of
the present test. Table 8-3 also shows, on the other hand, that changes
in the discount rate are not, as a rule, compatible with the assumption
that they were intended to maintain a stable rate of change in the price
level. This assumption is, indeed, so obviously contradicted by the data
that it will not be subject here to further investigation. The assumption
that discount rate policy was motivated by a desire to maintain stability
on a high level in the rate of expansion of industrial production does
not fare too well either. It is true that in no case was the discount rate
raised when industrial production was low; but many of the instances
of reductions of the discount rate cannot be explained by the position
of the target of industrial production. Additional evidence on this is
provided in Table 8-4, in which subperiods of imbalances of payments
TABLE 8-4














iv1955 —iv1956 stable high + stable
iv1956 —iii1957 fall normal + raised
in1957 —ii1961 rise normal + reduced considerably
ii1961 —iv1961 fall normal + raised
iv1961 —ii1963 rise fluctuates + reduced considerably
n1963 —iv1963 stable high + stable
iv1963 —n1964 fall normal + raised
ii1964 —iv1965 rise low * lowered
iv1965 —iv1966 stable high + stable
+ indicates that the policy variable changes in the direction required for bal-
ance-of-payments adjustment; no change would be justified by the movement of
industrial production.
* indicates that the policy variables' movement is consistent with the positions
of both the balance of payments andindustrialproduction.172DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
serve again as units of observation. It may be seen immediately that
the movements of the discount rate in each of these subperiods could
be explained by a wish to correct imbalances of payments, but not—
with a single exception—by the desire to maintain a high rate of
expansion in production. This evidence seems to provide another strong
basis for rejecting the assumption that discount rate policy was intended
to promote a high rate of growth. The assumption, on the other hand,
that this policy was manipulated in the interest of balance-of-payments
adjustment is strongly supported by these tests.
Table 8-5describesthe two alternative target variables—external
reserves and industrial production—during periods in which the budget
displayed clearly either surpluses or deficits. It may be seen, from
column 2, that the assumption that budgetary was used to adjust
imbalances of payments could not be sustained by this evidence: it is
supported by only• a single episode—that of the budgetary deficit of
iii 1962—iu 1963—out of the six listed in Table 8-5.Thealternative
assumption, that budgetary policy was used to serve the target of a
high rate of expansion of industrial production, fares much better; it
is supported by four episodes (out of five), and clearly rejected by
none.
TABLE 8-5










iv1950 —ii1951 surplus * stable n.a.
iv1953 —i1955 deficit * no trend + low
ii1955 —i1957 surplus — rise + high
ii1960 —i1961 surplus * no trend * normal
in1962 —iu1963 deficit + rise + low
'I1964 —iv1966 deficit * stable + low
Nom: See Table 8-3 for explanation of symbols.n.a. =notavailable.JAPAN 173
3. Summary and Interpretation
From all the evidence presented, it appears that budgetary policy in
Japan did not usually serve as an instrument for adjusting balance-of-
payments disequiibria. It seems possible that, insofar as budgetary
policy was regarded as a tool to be used in the pursuance of economic
policy, it was allocated to the target of preserving a high rate of expan-
sion of economic activity.
Monetary developments, on the other hand, definitely appear to
respond to the movements of the balance of payments, and monetary
policy may be viewed as being geared to the needs of balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment. Imbalances of payments lead to changes in monetary
variables in accordance with the following typical pattern.
In a downward imbalance, that is, a downward tendency of external
reserves, the Bank of Japan invariably reacts by raising the discount
rate. From information available, it also seems likely that the Bank
would use "moral suasion," or "disóount-window guidance," in an effort
to restrict the amount of credit extended by commercial banks to their
customers. At the same time, however, the change in the public's
demand for this credit would be expected to move in the opposite
direction. This is a period in which the amount of liquidity available to
the economy from the (net) acquisition of foreign-exchange reserves
is falling, that is, the loss of reserves tends to diminish the amount of
liquid means. As a result, demand for bank credit by the public must
rise. In the end, the rate of credit expansion may tend to show a slight
tendency to fall during downward imbalances, although this tendency
is far from being consistent. This seems to be an indication that the
aforementioned restrictions on the supply of credit are effective. To
what extent this may be attributed to cost restrictions (through the
increase of the discount rate), or how much of it may be due to direct
quantitative restrictions ("window guidance"), is impossible to tell on
the basis of available information.7
The increase in the discount rate would act as a cost restriction in either of
two ways. If the rates charged by banks on loans to their customers remain
unchanged, the increased cost incurred by the banks themselves on their borrow-
ing from the central bank would act as a deterrent to their borrowing and relend-
ing(or lending and rediscounting). If, on the other hand, the banks "pass on" the
increase in their cost by raising the interest rates charged on their lending, the
amount of credit demanded by the public should tend to decline. As a rule,174DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
But even when the rate of credit expansion d.oes fall, this tendency
is only slight. To maintain the expansion of credit, commercial banks
must take some compensatory action with regard to their own liquidity
or reserves. Bank liquidity is affected by three major factors (disre-
garding the possibility of changes in the public's desired currency
ratio): changes in the amount of external reserves, changes in the
amount of central bank lending to the government, and changes in
central bank lending to the commercial banks themselves. Information
about the second factor is deficient; but it does not seem likely that it
operates with enough force even nearly to offset the operation of the
first factor, changes in external reserves. Thus, in order to resist the
downward pressure on their liquidity, the banks resort to increased
borrowing from the central bank. They do so despite the increased cost
of this borrowing—presumably, as has been explained, as a result of
increased demand by the public for the bank credit.
The rate of expansion of money supply tends to move in an adjust-
.ing direction—to fall when external reserves fall—somewhat more
clearly than the variable of credit supply. But here, too, the tendency
is not strong or fully consistent.
In a period of an upward imbalance, this pattern is reversed; and
Bank of Japan lending to the government most often tends to increase.
Commercial banks use the added liquidity acquired by them not to
increase the rate of expansion of their lending to the public but to repay
debts to the Bank of Japan—despite the fall in the latter's discount
rate, which is a practically invariable consequence in this situation. The
rate of expansion of bank credit remains stable, or tends to rise, and
the rate of expansion of money supply tends to accelerate.
To sum up: the discount rate responds consistently to imbalances of
payments. At times of downward imbalances the discount rate is raised,
whereas in episodes of upward imbalances it is lowered. With less con-
sistency, the rate of expansion of money supply tends to move in the
same direction as the movement of external reserves. These, of course,
the former channel was probably more important in the Japanese case. The rates
charged by banks were subject to legal ceilings; usually, the rates found in effect
were the ceiling rates. Thus, changes in the discount rate were not transformed
into changes in the various rates charged by the banks, but acted through the
reduction of profitability of the bank's lending. This, in turn, should presumably
lead the banks, in such a time, to increase the proportion of favored, less risky
loans in their total lending. The special difficulties realized in fact by Japan's
small business sector during such periods may be an indication that this indeed
was the process.JAPAN 175
are tendencies consistent with the assumption that monetary policy
was used to adjust the balance of payments.
References
Allen, G. C., Japan's Economic Recovery, London, 1958.
The Bank of Japan, Annual Report, Tokyo, 1962—66.
The Bank of Japan, The Bank .0/Japan,Its Function and Organization,
Tokyo, 1964.
The Bank of Japan, Statistics Department, Economic Statistics of Japan,
annual, Tokyo, 1949—66.
The Bank of Japan, Statistics Department, Economic Statistics, monthly,
Tokyo, January, 1947—66.
Ezekiel, H., and Pate!, C., "Fluctuations in Japan's Balance of Payments
and the Role of Short-Term Capital Flows, 1959—66." International Mone-
tary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 14 (November, 1967), pp. 403—30.
Japan, Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, Monthly Sta-
tistics of Japan, Tokyo, Japan Statistical Association, July 1961—66.
Japanese Government. Economic Planning Agency. Economic Survey
of Japan, annual, Tokyo, The Japan Times, Ltd., 1945—66.
Japan, Ministry of Finance, Quarterly Bulletin of Financial Statistics,
Tokyo, 1926—66.
Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statistical Survey of Economy of
Japan, annual, Tokyo, 1953—66.
Koizumi,A., "Foreign Exchange Reserves as a Buffer in Japanese Coun-
tercyclical Policy," Tokyo, Hitotsubashi Academy Annuals, Vol. 9 (April,
1959),PP. 255—66.
Narvekar,P. R., "The 1954—55Improvementin Japan's Balance of Pay-
ments," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 6 (November,
1957), pp. 143—69.
"The Cycle in Japan's Balance of Payments," International
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 8 (December, 1961), pp. 380—411.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic
Surveys:Japan, annual,Paris.
Patrick, Hugh T., Monetary Policy and Central Banking in Contemporary
Japan. Bombay, 1962.